The Self as Story: Narrative Identity and Its Discontents
We tell ourselves we are the authors of our lives. But the neuroscience of memory suggests the narrator is unreliable — and perhaps always was.
Longer reflections on consciousness, technology, and the philosophy of everyday mental life.
We tell ourselves we are the authors of our lives. But the neuroscience of memory suggests the narrator is unreliable — and perhaps always was.
The problem of qualia — why there is something it is like to see red — remains the hardest knot in the philosophy of mind. I examine why functional accounts keep falling short.
Benjamin Libet’s experiments suggested that unconscious brain activity precedes conscious decisions. Decades later, the implications remain fiercely debated.
The brain does not passively receive sensory data. It generates predictions about what is out there and checks them against incoming signals. The implications for our understanding …
The ethics of artificial intelligence cannot be reduced to engineering trade-offs. It requires the kind of conceptual clarity that only philosophical inquiry can provide.
John Locke argued that personal identity consists in continuity of memory. Modern neuroscience suggests the relationship between memory and selfhood is more complex — and more …